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I. INTRODUCTION
"[Nlothing on the scale of the thalidomide tragedy has occurred
in the United States, even though potent teratogens do exist."'
"Accutane is as bad as thalidomide, but it doesn't have the
emotional connotation of thalidomide. 2
The regulation of pharmaceuticals is a controversial task: a constant
battle against limited resources, newly-discovered diseases, and the un-
certainties of science itself. Yet a system of governmental regulation is
* J.D., Stanford Law School, 1992; B.A., Yale College, 1987. I am grateful to
Professor Henry T. Greely for his advice and comments during the preparation
of this article, and to Professors Greely and Deborah L. Rhode for their continuing
guidance throughout my law school career.
IEvelyn Zamula, Drugs and Pregnancy: Often the Two Don't Mix, FDA CON-
SUMER, June 1989, at 9.
' Dr. Adrian Ive, quoted in Gina Kolata, Europeans Placed Stiffer Curbs on
Acne Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1988, at A25.
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preferable to allowing ineffective and potentially dangerous "medicines"
to flood the marketplace. With administrative controls, however, come
time-consuming procedures and institutionalized cost-benefit decisions.
Since we lack the resources to investigate all potentially beneficial drugs,
special interest groups fight against the government, manufacturers, and
each other in a quest to get "their" medications developed, tested, and
marketed.
Pharmaceutical regulation is complicated by a variety of intractable
dilemmas. The most basic is the choice between safety/efficacy and avail-
ability: to withhold approval until tests have shown that a drug is com-
pletely safe and effective denies access to people who may desperately
need the drug in the interim. Depending on the need for the drug, the
balance may shift; we are swayed by fewer studies when the drug is
indicated for a life-threatening illness, such as AIDS, than when the drug
is merely a new pain reliever. The problem is further complicated because
very sick patients want access to potentially effective drugs now, while
the information from continuing clinical trials is vital for a determination
of the drug's ultimate safety and efficacy.3 The history of U.S. drug reg-
ulation illustrates this tension between the claim that no drug should be
sold until we know it is totally safe and effective, and the reminder that
a drug is useless unless those who need it can get it.
Historically, many changes in pharmaceutical regulation have come
about in the face of "highly dramatic and publicized disasters.."4 The
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") of 1938 was passed in
response to the deaths caused by "Elixir Sulfonilamide," an untested
"drug" that contained a deadly poison. The European tragedy of thalido-
mide, a sedative that caused thousands of birth defects, led to a rethinking
of regulation in England and a tightening of U.S. restrictions. Starting
in the mid-1980's, the specter of AIDS has led the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration ("FDA") to create "fast-track" procedures, allowing prom-
ising therapies to reach needy patients sooner. These public tragedies
have produced public outrage and demands for change.
Yet other "tragedies," other problems with our regulatory system, don't
receive this attention. Although we have improved our procedures, we
are still far from being able to claim that approved drugs are safe for the
people who take them. For example, the drug Accutane 5 is used to treat
3 See, e.g., Richard J. Nelson, Note, Regulation of Investigational New Drugs:
'Giant Step for the Sick and Dying?' 77 Gao. L.J. 463, 465-67, 476-79 (1988).
4Harvey Teff, Drug Approval in England and the United States, 33 AM. J.
Comp. L. 567, 574 (1985).
6 "Accutane" is the trade name for isotretinoin, marketed by Roche pharma-
ceutical company, a division of Hoffman-LaRoche. Since isotretinoin is commer-
cially available only under the trade name "Accutane," I will refer to it as such.
Accutane has also been the subject of extensive products liability litigation, which
will not be addressed by this article.
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a rare but severely disfiguring form of acne. It is highly effective, but has
a number of severe side effects; in particular, like thalidomide, it causes
severe birth defects. Unlike thalidomide, however, our experiences with
Accutane have not spurred sweeping changes of regulatory policy. Ac-
cutane is a story about selective clinical testing, about the documentation
of severe side effects, and about efforts to educate and warn the public of
its dangers. It is, perhaps, a "success" story, an example of what inno-
vative measures can be used to minimize the dangers of a potent drug.
Yet Accutane also illustrates the shortcomings of our current regulatory
policy, and highlights the dilemmas inherent in any attempt to control
pharmaceuticals.
By a careful examination of the Accutane experience, both here and
abroad, I will illustrate some of the shortcomings of the current American
system of drug regulation. There are a number of ways in which this
system fails to live up to the strict regulatory philosophy that it purports
to follow; in particular, there are systemic inadequacies in the design of
clinical trials, the official labeling received by drugs, and the manner in
which adverse reaction reports are collected and assessed. Additionally,
although the system often works well, there are natural limitations to a
system of pre-approval testing; for some drugs, such as Accutane, it is
foreseeable that the current U.S. approach will not provide an adequate
degree of patient safety. It is my position that we must both improve
current regulatory safeguards to meet the stringent standards we have
set up, and also be willing to implement stricter post-approval controls
for the few distinct cases where pre-approval safety in the relevant patient
populations cannot be adequately assured.
Part II of this paper will provide background information on the history
and procedures of the FDA and the drug Accutane. Part III will analyze
the regulatory problems of our current system, as illustrated by our ex-
perience with Accutane. Part IV will explore an alternative method of
regulation, illustrated by that used in England.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Drug Regulation in the United States
The United States has regulated drugs in some form since 1906, al-
though the actual procedures have changed over time. While early laws
concentrated on the prevention of misbranding and adulteration, tragic
experiences led to the adoption of stringent requirements of safety, effi-
cacy, and quality. Yet there remains a great deal of flexibility in these
procedures, which allows the system to adapt to the changing realities
of scientific discoveries, patient needs, and pharmaceutical production.
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1. An Historical Overview 6
The Food and Drugs Act of 19067 was aimed at preventing the adul-
teration and misbranding of drugs. It required drugs to meet standards
of strength and purity, but not safety or efficacy. In addition, the Act
failed to provide for preventive remedies, and judicial interpretation se-
verely curtailed its effectiveness. Attempts to remedy the Act's loopholes"
were drafted so poorly that prosecution was nearly impossible.
Although a bill to revise the obsolete 1906 act was introduced in the
Senate in 1933, it took the tragedy of "Elixir Sulfonilamide," in which
107 people died, to prompt the passage of new legislation. The Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 19389 required manufacturers to provide
scientific evidence of drug safety, beginning what would become the major
means of drug regulation in the United States.10 The Act also removed
the intent requirement in misbranding cases, authorized factory inspec-
tions, provided injunctive remedies, and regulated cosmetics and foods.
However, still no proof of drug efficacy was required. The FDA quickly
took advantage of its new powers, and a variety of new regulations were
promulgated through the mid-1940's. In particular, statutory definitions
of "prescription drugs" were passed in the Humphrey-Durham Amend-
ment of 1951," and regulations were proposed to require full disclosure
in sales literature and information accompanying drug packaging.
Public outcry over the European thalidomide tragedy prompted Con-
gress to strengthen FDA control over new drugs in the Drug Amendments
of 1962.12 Thalidomide, a tranquilizer, was widely marketed as a sleeping
pill and morning sickness remedy. In the early 1960's, it became clear
that the drug had also caused grotesque deformities in thousands of Eu-
ropean babies. The drug was never marketed in the U.S. because Dr.
Frances 0. Kelsey, an FDA medical officer, determined that it failed to
meet the safety requirements of the 1938 Act.13 However, the experience
convinced Congress to amend the 1938 act, requiring by a unanimous
vote that new drugs be proven both safe and effective for their intended
uses. The Amendments created a detailed system of approval procedures,
I See generally Wallace F. Janssen, Outline of the History of U.S. Drug Reg-
ulation and Labeling, 36 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 420 (1981); Nelson, supra note
3; Teff, supra note 4; Dixie Farley, Benefit vs. Risk: How FDA Approves New
Drugs, in FROM TEST TUBE TO PATIENT: NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 27 (1988) (hereinafter FROM TEST TUBE TO PATIENT).
' Ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938).
' Sherley Amendment, Ch. 352, 37 Stat. 416 (1912).
9 Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).
10 See Janssen, supra note 6, at 429.
"Act of October 26, 1951. Ch. 578, 65 Stat. 648.
"Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
"3 The drug was distributed to U.S. doctors for the purposes of investigation,
however. One source identifies 17 cases of birth defects in the U.S., of which 10




including requirements for both animal studies and human clinical trials,
and in some cases applied the efficacy requirements retroactively to 1938.
Although subsequent amendments have updated and expanded specific
provisions, the basic framework of the 1962 system remains in place.
2. An Overview of FDA New Drug Approval 14
Before a new drug can be tested in humans, the manufacturer must
carry out a variety of tests in laboratory animals. Many of these address
the drug's ability to cause toxic side effects ("toxicity"), the relationship
of safety and dosage, and how the drug is absorbed and broken down by
the body.15 Since drugs may affect different animals in different ways,
two or more species are commonly used. However, humans may react
very differently to the drug than any test animal;'6 for this reason, animal
studies are only the first step towards drug approval.
Once animal testing is completed, the sponsor must submit the research
to the FDA, along with detailed descriptions of proposed human studies,
in the form of an "investigational new drug application" ("IND"). If the
agency believes the drug can safely be given to human volunteers, con-
trolled testing may begin. Clinical testing generally consists of three
phases of experiments, although this is not required by law.17 Phase I
trials are primarily concerned with the safety of the drug, and involve
fewer than 100 healthy, paid volunteers. These trials provide information
about how the drug is broken down in the body, what effects it has on
the body, and what side effects appear as the dosage is increased. They
generally last several months.
If unacceptable safety problems do not occur in Phase I, Phase II trials
may begin. These trials are designed to study the drug's efficacy for its
intended purpose, although short-term side effects in target patient pop-
ulations may also be discovered. They usually involve several hundred
patients with the particular disease or condition indicated, and last for
several months to two years. Phase II studies are randomized control
trials, in which a "treatment" group (which receives the drug) is compared
to a "control" group (which receives a standard treatment or placebo).
These trials are often "blinded," with neither patient nor doctor aware of
14 See generally Jeffrey P. Cohn, The Beginnings: Laboratory and Animal Stud-
ies, in FROM TEST TUBE TO PATIENT, supra note 6, at 8; Ken Flieger, Testing in
'Real People' in FROM TEST TUBE TO PATIENT, supra note 6, at 13; Dr. Frank E.
Young, Experimental Drugs for the Desperately Ill, in FROM TEST TUBE To PATIENT,
supra note 6, at 24; Nelson, supra note 3.
"See Cohn, supra note 14, at 10.
1 See, e.g., Teff, supra note 4, at 577 n.52 (penicillin is lethal to guinea pigs);
Zamula, supra note 1, at 9 (human sensitivity to thalidomide is 100 times that
of rats and 50 times that of rabbits).
17 See Nelson, supra note 3, at 470, n.52.
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which treatment is being received. Finally, Phase III trials may involve
several thousand patients with the indicated disease, and may last four
years or more. They are designed to approximate normal medical usage
of the drug, and to discover less common side effects and other infor-
mation. Upon completion, the sponsor files a "New Drug Application"
("NDA") with the FDA. Final approval of the drug will depend on whether
the manufacturer has proven that the drug is safe' and effective, and
the development of satisfactory official labeling.19 A drug's labeling con-
tains the approved indications, recommended dosage levels, and lists of
warnings, contraindications (conditions in which the drug should not be
used) and reported side effects. It is usually found in the form of a "package
insert" accompanying a drug, but versions may also be tailored specifi-
cally to patients or to prescribing physicians.
Some drugs reach patients by alternate means. For many years the
FDA permitted investigational new drugs to be used for treatment in
particular cases under ad hoc "Treatment INDs" or "Compassionate
INDs.' '20 In 1987, the FDA revised its official IND policies to allow patients
with immediately life-threatening or serious illnesses to obtain experi-
mental drugs without enrolling in research trials.2 ' Drugs for immedi-
ately life-threatening diseases may receive such approval near the end
of Phase II trials; drugs for serious diseases may receive approval during
Phase 111.22 The controversial measure also allows drug companies to
charge for these drugs. The FDA then proposed a "fast track" to approval
for drugs for life-threatening or severely debilitating illnesses, which
includes a greater interaction between drug sponsors and the FDA in
designing Phase II trials and a more lenient FDA risk-benefit analysis.2 3
The ultimate effects of these controversial changes are not yet fully ap-
parent.
Although the FDA requires proof of safety and efficacy in the drug's
intended conditions, an approved drug may be prescribed for conditions
other than those indicated. However, the FDA has a number of regulations
11 The sponsor must prove that the drug is safe for "its intended conditions of
use ... by adequate testing by all methods reasonably applicable ... A higher
degree of risk may be considered acceptable when no alternative treatment is
available or when a drug is indicated for use after alternative treatment has been
unsuccessful." 1 Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 71,010 (Aug. 6, 1990).
19According to 1988 estimates, approximately 70% of drugs complete Phase I
clinical trials, 33% complete Phase II, and 25-30% complete Phase III. Of 100
INDs, only an average of 20 will be approved for marketing. Flieger, supra note
14, at 14.
20 James M. Johnstone, Treatment IND Safety Assessment: Potential Legal and
Regulatory Problems, 43 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 533 (1988).
21 52 Fed. Reg. 19,466 (1987).
22 See Young, supra note 14, at 24-25. But see Nelson, supra note 3, at 472-73,
478-79 (claiming that drugs for serious diseases may actually be approved dan-
gerously early in Phase II).
?3 53 Fed. Reg. 41,516 (1988).
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designed to assure the continuing safety of marketed drugs. In large part,
the FDA relies on reports and records kept by drug sponsors. For example,
the sponsor must notify the FDA of all "adverse drug experiences," defined
as "any adverse event[s] associated with the use of a drug in humans,
whether or not considered drug-related. '24 The deadlines for these reports
vary with the severity of the reaction. 25 If such reports indicate a safety
problem, the FDA can withdraw the drug from the market. As the story
of Accutane illustrates, however, the FDA also has a variety of less drastic
ways to address a potential problem.
B. Accutane: An Overview
Accutane was developed as an acne treatment in Switzerland in the
1950's, but awareness of the drug's teratogenic properties (ability to cause
birth defects) convinced the company not to pursue marketing approval.2 6
In the late 1970's, Hoffman-LaRoche began testing the drug for use in
treating severe recalcitrant cystic acne, a disfiguring and debilitating
form of acne caused by a chronic oil gland disorder. Mindful of the drug's
teratogenicity, most test centers excluded women from the trials; the drug
was tested in only 550 people before receiving FDA approval.2 7 In May
1982, the U.S. became the first country to approve Accutane for use in
the treatment of severe recalcitrant cystic acne. The unusually quick FDA
approval, coming only nine months after the NDA submission, alarmed
some doctors. 2 The original package insert contained warnings against
the drug's use in pregnant women, but noted only that the drug caused
birth defects in animals.
By mid-1983, Roche became aware of at least three cases of malformed
children born to women who had taken Accutane, and passed this infor-
mation along to doctors in the form of "Dear Doctor" letters. In August,
24 Records and Reports for Approved Products, 1 Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep.
(CCH) 71,040 (Aug. 6, 1990). Note that the burden of reporting falls on the
drug's sponsor, and generally not on the prescribing physician. Realistically, how-
ever, if physicians do not report adverse events to the sponsor, the latter may not
know of the reactions.
For example, "15-day alert reports" are required when a "serious and un-
expected event" has occurred, or when there is an "increased frequency of expected
event[s]." Id.
According to the drug's inventor, ["In the 1970s], in the psychological climate
engendered by the thalidomide tragedy, it would have been inconceivable to
develop an agent with teratogenic properties for the treatment of such a common
complaint as acne." Dr. Werner Bollag, quoted in Diane A. Nygaard, Accutane:
Is the Drug a Prescription for Birth Defects?, TaIAL, Dec. 1988, at 81.
2 Id. In the United States, the drug was only tested in 170 patients at four
universities and the National Cancer Institute. See Penny Chorlton, FDA Out-
paced Firm on Acne Drug, WASH. PosT, Sept. 14, 1982, at A17.
2 See, e.g., Dr. Frank Yoder, Isotretinoin: a Word of Caution, 249 JAMA 350(1983) (letter from Dr. Frank Yoder, a former NIH researcher, claiming that the
toxicity of Accutane was "seriously underemphasized").
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the FDA published a description of 12 reported cases of "adverse preg-
nancy outcomes" with Accutane. 29 In September, after the consumer ad-
vocacy group Public Citizen claimed that the drug's warnings were in-
adequate and that it was being oversold, Roche revised Accutane's la-
beling to include information about human birth defects.
30
By 1984, 21 cases of Accutane-associated birth defects and 24 sponta-
neous abortions had been reported to the FDA.3 1 At this point, Dr. Paul
J. Benke published a study of two infants born to mothers who had taken
Accutane.3 2 Benke identified an "isotretinoin teratogen syndrome," con-
sisting of abnormalities of the central nervous system, ear, and face. For
many, Accutane was even more dangerous than thalidomide; while the
victims of thalidomide suffered from shortened and deformed limbs, the
victims of Accutane are often retarded, with serious brain and central
nervous system damage.33 In addition, Accutane's effects may occur if the
drug is taken even briefly during the first trimester, a time when many
women do not yet know they are pregnant. 34 As a result, Accutane's
warnings about birth defects were strengthened in- 1984; suggestions
included the use of contraception for a month before and after therapy,
pregnancy tests prior to therapy, and advice that blood banks refuse
exposed donors.3 5 Roche embarked on a program to educate prescribing
physicians about the dangers of the drug, even taking out a "Medical
Director's Page" in the Journal of the American Medical Association to
stress that Accutane was contraindicated in pregnancy.
36
Publicity efforts and minor labeling changes continued for the next few
years. By April 1988 the FDA had concluded that the education and
warnings had not been effective 3 7 and asked the Dermatologic Drugs
Franz W. Rosa, Teratogenicity of Isotretinoin, 1983 LANCET 513.
10 See Additional Warnings Urged for Accutane, [Developments 1983-1984]
Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 42,888 (Sept. 8 and 26, 1983).
11 See Janice S. Lewis, Accutane and Birth Defects, TRIAL, April 1985, at 16.
32 Dr. Paul J. Benke, The Isotretinoin Teratogen Syndrome, 251 JAMA 3267
(1984). For additional information on the teratogenicity of isotretinoin, see, e.g.,
Edward J. Lammer et al., Retinoic Acid Embryopathy, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 837
(1985).
See Nancy Blodgett, Acne Control vs. Birth Defects, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1988,
at 17.
See Nygaard, supra note 26, at 82. An exposed woman has a 40% chance of
having a miscarriage, and at least a 25% chance of producing a deformed baby.
Id.
" Accutane Warnings Expanded: Blood Banks Asked Not to Accept Donations
from Persons Under Treatment, [Developments 1983-84] Food Drug Cosm. L.
Rep. (CCH) 43,229 (March 29, 1984).
252 JAMA 2623 (1984).
3' An FDA study released on April 22, 1988, estimated that 16,000-24,000
pregnant women were exposed to Accutane between 1982 and 1986. Although
only 62 formal reports of birth defects had been filed, the FDA estimated the
actual number to be 900 to 1300 cases. Michael Abramowitz & Philip J. Hilts,
FDA Eyes Ban on Acne Drug: Study Links Use by Pregnant Women to Birth
Defects, WASH. POST, April 23, 1988, at Al.
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Advisory Committee for recommendations. The Committee suggested
stronger package warnings, greater physician education efforts, and writ-
ten patient acknowledgements. The FDA adopted stringent changes, in-
cluding informed consent forms, large-sized boxed contraindications
sections, inclusion in the labeling itself of a depiction of an infant with
the syndrome, use of a "nonpregnancy" symbol, increased educational
efforts through "Pregnancy Prevention Kits," and new packaging.38 The
FDA declined to accept the Committee's recommendation that only cer-
tain types of physicians (i.e., dermatologists), be allowed to prescribe the
drug. 39 Although such an approach is common in Europe, it would have
been a drastic departure from U.S. norms. In May 1990, the FDA took
further steps under consideration, including preparation of a videocas-
sette to be shown in doctors' offices and further encouragement of pre-
therapy pregnancy testing.40
Not all the news about Accutane has been grim, however. Since 1988,
researchers have studied the use of Accutane as a cancer treatment.
Accutane appears to be a promising therapy for certain types of skin and
head and neck cancers.41 Although the drug is not officially indicated for
use in the treatment of cancers, under the U.S. regulatory system phy-
sicians may continue to investigate and prescribe the drug for these and
other uses without such formal approval. For now, Accutane remains a
controversial drug. Yet its story is a useful illustration of the U.S. phi-
losophy of drug regulation, and the potential problems with this approach
in the areas of pretrial testing in relevant patient populations, tracking
adverse drug events, and reacting to newly discovered dangers.
III. REGULATORY PROBLEMS ILLUSTRATED BY ACCUTANE
A. Drug Regulatory Philosophy in the United States
The choice between safety and availability clearly influences the type
of regulatory system that is imposed. A country that favors safety will
require prolonged testing of the drug, but at the expense of the patients
who need the drug in the interim. A country that favors early availability
38 See, e.g., Stricter Limits on Isotretinoin Issued to Manufacturer, [Develop-
ments 1987-881 Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 40,843 (May 19 and 27, 1988);
Accutane Patient Consent Forms Will be Required Under Revised Labeling, FDA
Tells Roche: Company Has 15 Days to Submit Timetable to Agency, THE PINK
SHEET, May 30, 1988, at 6-7.
39 See Nygaard, supra note 26, at 82.
- Charles Maywick, Additional Steps Proposed to Ensure Antiacne Drug Used
Only in Appropriate Patient Population, 263 JAMA 3125-26 (1990).
41 See, e.g., Kenneth H. Kraemer et al., Prevention Of Skin Cancer in Xeroderma
Pigmentosum With the Use of Oral Isotretinoin, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1633 (1988);
Acne Drug May Help Block Return of Throat Tumors, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1990,
at C12; Sally Squires, An Acne Drug May Prevent a Form of Cancer, WASH. POST.,
Sept. 26, 1990, Health at 11.
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will require less testing, but will carefully monitor post-approval drug
experiences; however, patients may suffer severe reactions before deci-
sion-makers respond to the post-market reports. Although a regulatory
system usually favors one such approach, many nations are flexible when
it comes to particularly necessary but potentially dangerous drugs.
In striking the balance between drug safety and availability, the U.S.
comes down firmly in favor of stringent pre-market safety requirements.
As one commentator has put it, the
exacting demands of the U.S. process reveal a perceived need
to go to extreme lengths in an effort to establish drug safety
prior to marketing .... FDA supervision commences at an
earl[y] stage... and has paid relatively little attention to post-
market surveillance.4
2
Consistent with this philosophy, the U.S. has strict procedural require-
ments (described in Part II) to assure that the drug is safe for its intended
conditions. The U.S. also monitors adverse drug reactions, and has a great
deal of flexibility in responding to such reports. Yet despite these safe-
guards, serious adverse reactions still occur; for example, the arthritis/
pain-killing drugs Oraflex (benoxaprofen, Lilly), Zomax (zomepirac,
McNeil), and Suprol (suprofen, McNeil) were all removed from the market
in the 1980's after causing deaths, kidney or liver disease, or severe
allergic reactions. 43 In light of the number of drugs that have been taken
off the market or have been forced to change their official labeling, the
adequacy of the U.S. system is by no means clear. The history of Accutane
is one example of how these procedures both do and do not work.
1. Pre-Approval Clinical Testing
For pre-approval testing to function as proof of drug safety, the tests
must use patients and conditions that closely resemble those in which
the drug will be used in practice. On the other hand, ill patients must
not be exposed to excessive dangers, and the drug should reach the market
in a reasonable amount of time. The U.S. guidelines attempt to take all
this into account. But recent evidence suggests that there still is inade-
quate testing in the patients who will eventually receive the drug.
•42 Teff, supra note 4, at 579.
- Other drugs removed from the market for similar reasons include the an-
tidepressants Merital (nomifensine, Hoechst) and Wellbutrin (buproprion, Bur-
roughs-Wellcome), as well as the high-blood pressure drug Selacryn (ticrynafen,
SmithKline Beckman). In addition, the FDA lowered the recommended doses of
the anesthetic Versed (midazolam, Roche), and Merrell Dow halted production of
the morning sickness remedy Bendectin after allegations that it caused birth
defects. See Sidney M. Wolfe, FDA Approval Doesn't Guarantee a Drug's Safety,
WASH. POST, July 19, 1989, at A22; Company Stops Making Morning Sickness
Drug, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1983, at A16.
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For example, certain patient populations have traditionally been ex-
cluded from clinical trials on ethical grounds, due to the excessive risks
involved. A pregnant woman cannot participate in pre-market studies
because untested drugs may harm the fetus; pre-market pregnancy data
comes only from laboratory animals. 44 Other populations have also been
traditionally overlooked. Because menstrual cycle fluctuations can con-
found research, even female laboratory animals have been excluded from
some clinical trials. Since drugs may be metabolized differently by chil-
dren and the elderly, these groups are rarely included in initial trials.
45
Despite increasing knowledge of the different ways in which different
ethnic groups metabolize drugs, minorities are often underrepresented
in clinical trials.46 The problem with such selectivity is that these drugs
are often used by such "excluded" patients, and the precise factors that
made these patients hard to study (e.g., menstrual cycle fluctuations)
make it likely that the drug will affect them differently.
Accutane is a good example of this. Aware that laboratory tests showed
the drug was teratogenic in rabbits and rats, most test centers excluded
women from the studies; at other centers, women were required to have
a negative pregnancy test before starting therapy, to use an effective
contraceptive, and to agree to undergo an abortion if they conceived. 47 As
a result, there was no documentation of birth defects caused in humans,
and the original drug labeling said as much. Nor did the labeling require
the stringent anti-pregnancy measures that were required at the trial
stage.48 Although severe recalcitrant cystic acne occurs more frequently
in males, it was clear that some women of childbearing age would be
proper candidates for Accutane therapy. Given this knowledge, a much
stricter warning against use during pregnancy would have seemed proper
from the start.
Accutane is by no means the only drug whose clinical trials produced
little information about much of the patient population. As one commen-
tator has noted, "[t]he net result is that the potential effects of drugs are
often most conjectural for the categories of patients whose drug con-
sumption is the greatest."49 While the elderly are often excluded from
trials because of their reduced ability to remove drugs from the body (via
the liver and kidneys) and their frequent use of many medications at
4See Zamula, supra note 1, at 9.
4See Sally Squires, A Look at Research Involving Women, WASH. PosT, Dec.
12, 1989, Health at 9.
See, e.g., Graig K. Svensson, Representation of American Blacks in Clinical
Trials of New Drugs, 261 JAMA 263 (1989); Paul Cotton, Examples Abound of
Gaps in Medical Knowledge Because of Groups Excluded from Scientific Study,
263 JAMA 1051 (1990).
41 See Nygaard, supra note 26, at 81.
-According to a former Hoffman-LaRoche dermatologist, "[tihis was very, very
wrong.... It is incredible to require that in a study, but not in a mass market
situation." Dr. Frank W. Yoder, quoted in Abramowitz and Hilts, supra note 37,
at A12.
49 Teff, supra note 4, at 588.
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once, they also consume a great deal of medication. For example, the anti-
arthritis pain-killer Oraflex was tested in only 52 people over the age of
65 in English trials.W° Yet as an arthritis treatment, the drug was largely
used by the elderly. It was withdrawn from the market in 1982 after being
linked to deaths from liver and kidney damage.
The lack of clinical studies using women subjects has been the topic of
much debate since Congress asked the General Accounting Office ("GAO")
in 1989 to analyze the practices of the National Institutes of Health
("NIH") in this area. A 1990 report found that NIH had made little
progress in implementing a four-year-old policy to include more women
in government-funded studies.5 1 Much of the controversy has focused on
recent studies of heart disease, such as the National Heart, Lung and
Blood Institute's aspirin study and the Multiple Risk Factors Intervention
Trial (referred to, ironically, as "Mr. Fit"). As a result of these practices,
physicians are often unsure whether the data from these studies can be
applied to their female patients. Those who do extrapolate are, in essence,
running small-scale experiments on their patients rather than providing
proven therapy.
It is clear that clinical trials do not provide an adequate assessment of
drug safety for many of the ultimate consumers of the drug. For many
groups, such as women and the elderly, the solution is clear: study these
subjects, either as part of the regular trials or in separate studies. The
answer is less obvious for patient groups, such as pregnant women, where
ethical constraints are more compelling. Yet one lesson of Accutane is
that, if the risks are too high to justify testing in a particular population,
that information must be publicized from the start.
2. Pre-Approval Testing and Unlimited Drug Access
Presently, a drug approved in the U.S. may be prescribed by any li-
censed physician for any ailment, not just those for which the drug offi-
cially received approval; ideally, a drug's other uses and abuses will be
taken into account by the FDA during its initial safety assessment.52
While many beneficial uses are discovered in this manner, potential dan-
gers also exist in a system stressing pre-approval testing. In practice, a
Id. at 588-89, n.96.
11 See, e.g., NIH Has Not 'Adequately'Implemented Policy to Enroll More Women
in NIH-Sponsored Clinical Trials, THE BLUE SHEET, June 20, 1990, at 3; Susan
Okie, Study: NIH Slow to Include Women in Disease Research, WASH. PosT, June
19, 1990, at A10; Diana Morgan, Unlocking Research Barriers: Feds Promise to
Include Women in Clinical Trials, AARP BULL. at 1. In response, NIH set up the
Office of Research on Women's Health in September 1990.
-2 1 Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 71,010 (Aug. 6, 1990) (stating that
"[wihen there has been specific evidence of other probable use or potential abuse
of a drug, these have been considered by the FDA in evaluating safety.")
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drug may be prescribed for patients who were not included in clinical
trials because they did not have the "indicated condition" that was being
studied. If this actual patient population is a distinct clinical group (e.g.,
the elderly), the differences in the way patients react to drugs (and vice
versa) may mean that little real proof of safety exists. If the actual patient
population is much larger and more varied than the test population, as
with Accutane, the incidence of side effects may vary greatly. In either
case, it is difficult to extrapolate from clinical studies when patients use
the drug for purposes different from those studied.
Accutane is an example of both the positive and negative side of this
system. On the positive side, Accutane is now under investigation as a
therapeutic and preventive agent for various forms of cancer. Many bene-
ficial new uses are discovered when physicians observe patients who use
the drug for its approved indications, long-before any full-scale clinical
research is contemplated. Limiting a drug to use for only its approved
conditions might deprive scientists of such incidental discoveries. Re-
quiring every possible new use of a drug to begin at the laboratory stage
would also use a great deal of time and money.
The evidence on the negative side of the Accutane story, however,
weighs heavily against unlimited access. By September 1983, the Public
Citizen Health Research Group had charged that the drug, prescribed by
90% of U.S. dermatologists in its first year on the market, was being
given to patients with less severe and easily treatable forms of acne.53
This meant that a great deal more women of childbearing age were ex-
posed to Accutane than was clinically necessary. In 1988, one FDA staffer
estimated that only 4,300 women each year truly had acne severe enough
to warrant the use of Accutane.54 According to these statistics, about
15,000 women between the ages of 15 and 44 fell within this category
between 1982 and 1987, but 270,000 to 390,000 actually received the
drug.
The simple fact that the drug could be prescribed for conditions other
than severe recalcitrant cystic acne did not necessarily mean that it would
be; a great deal of blame rests on the media attention and promotion
received by the drug.5 Opponents contend that the drug was "overprom-
oted and oversold, placing an unnecessarily large number of patients at
risk. ' 56 The excessive media attention raised patient awareness of the
drug's benefits, but not its side effects. Patients demanded the acne "won-
See Phillip J. Hilts, Acne Drug is Oversold, Group Says, WASH. POST, Sept.
9, 1983, at A4.
14Dr. David Graham, quoted in Michael Waldholz, FDA Panel Suggests Strict
Limits on Use of Acne Drug That Causes Birth Defects, WALL ST. J., April 27,
1988, at 3. Roche disagreed, setting the figure at 78,000. Id.
55 David Graham, quoted in Popular Anti-Acne Drug Linked to Birth Defects,
TatAL, June 1988, at 90. The FDA estimated in 1988 that 1 in 23 Americans has
used the drug, and that 97% of the prescriptions were inappropriate. See Nygaard,
supra note 26, at 82.
56 Lewis, supra note 31, at 16. See also Nygaard, supra note 26, at 83.
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der drug," and many physicians were happy to comply. As one researcher
admitted, "[i]sotretinoin has been promoted by many physicians as a
"cure" for acne, so it was inevitable that infants would be born after being
exposed in the first trimester of pregnancy."57 The "inevitability" of this
tragic result had Accutane been restricted to its approved use is not clear.
What is clear, however, is that the mixture of pre-approval testing, legal
use of prescription drugs for non-approved purposes, and the media at-
tention common in an information-based market economy can be a dan-
gerous combination.
3. Limits of Pre-Market Approval Mechanisms
In theory, careful pre-market testing is a very good idea. In practice,
as the above discussion illustrates, it has many flaws. While some of these
flaws may be attributed to the unique American medical economy, there
are problems inherent in any system relying on pre-market testing.
The main problem is that many severe adverse reactions are rare
enough that they "will not necessarily manifest themselves until a drug
has been used by a far greater proportion of the population than is feasible
even with extensive pre-market testing."5 8 A fatal reaction that occurs
in one out of every 50,000 patients will probably not be discovered in a
trial of even 5,000 subjects, but will occur if 500,000 people actually take
the drug. The same can be said of reactions that occur only after long-
term use; even the most comprehensive clinical trials do not duplicate
the conditions of a patient who must remain on therapy for the rest of
her life. In addition, it is easy to forget that medications require a trade-
off between the dangers of the underlying condition and those of the drug.
If a drug is potent enough to work, it will probably have some side effects. 59
Thus, "[t]he public good requires the FDA to make judgments based on
necessarily incomplete information. ' 60 While pre-approval testing pro-
cedures can be improved a great deal, there is a point at which only life-
long testing in the entire patient population would provide perfect data.
Since this is not a feasible solution, the logical next step is to create post-
market procedures to track and address adverse reactions that pre-ap-
proval testing missed. It is to these procedures, both in the U.S. and
abroad, that we now turn.
'7Benke, supra note 32, at 3267.
Teff, supra note 4, at 579. See also Olli S. Miettinen, Alternatives to Clinical
Trials in Post-Marketing Research on Drug Effects, in DRUGs BETWEEN RESEARCH
AND REGULATIONS 65 (C. Steichle et al., eds., 1984).
59 See, e.g., Dr. F. Gilbert McMahon, How Safe Should Drugs Be?, 249 JAMA
481 (1983) (Commentary). In many cases, the more serious the disease, the more
potent the drug and hence its side effects. There are notable exceptions, however,
such as the use of antibiotics to treat many infections.
60 Id. at 482.
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B. Adverse Reaction Reporting in the United States
Mindful of some of the shortcomings of clinical trials, the U.S. has a
system for tracking post-market adverse reactions. In contrast to other
countries, however, the U.S. system is weakly enforced and the infor-
mation it generates is underutilized. This attitude is somewhat consistent
with an overall regulatory philosophy that stresses pre-approval proof of
safety over post-approval "clean-up."
The U.S. system depends in large part on cooperation between the FDA
and drug companies, who are required by law to report most adverse
reactions within a specified period of time;61 physician reporting is vol-
untary. To facilitate collection and analysis of this data, the FDA estab-
lished a Division of Drug and Biological Product Experience and designed
a Drug Experience Report form and guidelines for determining the like-
lihood that a drug caused the adverse event.6 2 Once the reports are re-
ceived, the FDA puts them into a computerized Adverse Drug Reaction
("ADR") system, and analyzes the data for patterns of adverse effects.
Once patterns of toxicity emerge, the FDA may take a variety of actions.
Although the system is adequate in theory, whether or not it actually
works is the subject of some debate. One of the main drawbacks to the
U.S. system is that only drug companies, and not physicians, are required
to report adverse reactions. The drug companies must rely, in turn, upon
reports voluntarily made by physicians and information gathered by drug
salespeople during their sales calls with physicians. In fact, the FDA
admits that fewer than 10% of physicians report reactions, and those
physicians only report a small percentage of the reactions they actually
observe.r There is some evidence that the voluntary system works; for
example, the pain reliever Suprol was suspended by its manufacturer
after voluntary physician reports of flank pain and temporary kidney
failure in healthy male patients were received.6 There is also scientific
evidence that education can increase the number of voluntary physician
reports; in one study, after two years of educational intervention there
was more than a 17-fold increase in adverse reports submitted by the
physician subjects compared with the yearly average prior to the study.6
Yet the wisdom of relying on voluntary reports for such important infor-
mation is still questionable.
61 See Records and Reports for Approved Products, supra note 24.
62 For an outline of the FDA guidelines, as well as a sample of the form, see
R. Dorrien Venn, Adverse Reactions and Interactions of Drugs, in NEw DRUG
APPROVAL PROCESS: CLINICAL AND REGULATORY MANAGEMENT 223-30 (Richard A.
Guarino ed. 1987).
See Samuel Ackerman, Watching for Problems Testing May Have Missed, in
FROM TEST TUBE TO PATIENT, supra note 6, at 51-53.
" See Allen C. Rossi, et al., The Importance of Adverse Reaction Reporting by
Physicians: Suprofen and the Flank Pain Syndrome, 259 JAMA 1203 (1988).
H. Denman Scott, et al., Physician Reporting of Adverse Drug Reactions:
Results of the Rhode Island Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting Project, 263 JAMA
1785 (1990).
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Other criticisms of the system concern what the FDA does with the
information once it is received, and how often the agency uses its power
to require more stringent surveillance of a particular drug. According to
a 1986 GAO report, the ADR computer system misplaced a substantial
portion of the reports it received each year.6 6 In addition, many of the
reports contained inaccurate data, and the information was of little use
to the reviewers responsible for assessing the safety of specific drugs.67
Other commentators have stressed that the FDA has the power to require
much more stringent post-marketing surveillance, yet has chosen to apply
that power in only a select few cases (such as the heroin substitute meth-
adone) .S6
The present ADR system does have its proponents. For some, Accutane
is an example of the system's "success": because the manufacturer and
FDA received reports of birth defects, the FDA was able to require much
stricter warnings against use during pregnancy.6 9 Yet there are those who
would undoubtedly say that even one birth defect was too many for a
drug that sponsors always knew had teratogenic potential. At the very
least, some might question the effectiveness of the stronger warnings in
preventing Accutane use during pregnancy, or criticize the delay between
the first reports of birth defects and the requirement of much more strin-
gent warnings and procedures. In addition, post-marketing surveillance
did not generate the type of information that most researchers find es-
sential, including adequate assessments of exposure rates during preg-
nancy and a calculated risk of adverse outcomes.70 If Accutane is an
example of how the U.S. ADR system "works," it may raise serious ques-
tions about the effectiveness of the overall U.S. regulatory scheme.
C. Post-Approval Controls in the United States
Of course, monitoring reports of adverse drug reactions is only part of
the process: for the system to control the safety of marketed drugs, there
must be an adequate response to the gathered information. The U.S.
approach is extremely flexible in this regard, allowing the FDA many
avenues of action before removing a drug from the market. Once again,
Accutane tested just how creative the system could be.
66See PINK SHEET 1986, Oct. 20, 1986, (LEXIS, Genmed library, T&G-8, T&G-
9) (estimating that about 10,000 of the 40,000 ADRs received each year are
missing because the FDA fails to enter them into the computer system).
67 Id.
Robert L. Fleshner, Post-Marketing Surveillance of Prescription Drugs: Do
We Need to Amend the FDCA? 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 327, 344-45 (1981).
6E See Zamula, supra note 1, at 9.
70See, e.g., Correspondence, 321 NEW ENG, J. MED. 756 (1989) (letter from
Health Research Group in response to April 13 Sounding Board article by Dr.
Robert Stern). See also Lawrence K. Altman, Medical Dilemma: Necessary Drugs
With Intolerable Dangers, N.Y. TiMEs, May 3, 1988, at C3, col. 1.
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1. The Developing Accutane Warnings
Accutane presented a very compelling scenario for the use of flexible
regulatory measures: the only available treatment for a physically and
psychologically debilitating disease, it posed major risks only in one spe-
cific population. The FDA dealt with this danger through a combination
of warnings and education, which became increasingly more stringent
and creative as birth defects continued to occur. The perceived failure of
these approaches leaves open the question of whether the U.S. system is
fundamentally inadequate, or whether Accutane simply presented a com-
bination of features that stretched the system beyond its limits.
The original Accutane labeling included such side effects as severe
drying and chapping of lips and elevated cholesterol levels;71 it referred
to evidence of birth defects in animal studies, but stated there was no
such evidence for humans (an accurate statement, since pregnant women
were excluded from the clinical trials). Statements were included to the
effect that women of childbearing age should not be given Accutane unless
they used effective contraception, and that counseling should be available
to discuss the possible effects on a fetus and the desirability of continuing
any pregnancy that occurred during treatment. At least one commentator
has put the bulk of the blame on this initial labeling, claiming that
"[i]nstead of starting out with rigorous restrictions on Accutane, to be
relaxed in the light of experience, the FDA took the opposite approach.
72
Knowing that the drug was likely to cause birth defects (as acknowledged
by the stringent contraception/voluntary abortion requirements of the
clinical trials), the FDA relied on fairly standard labeling and warnings.
In the face of widespread media coverage of the "miracle cure," this was
simply not enough.
Education efforts began soon after the drug entered the U.S. market.
Dr. Frank Yoder warned his colleagues of numerous side effects in the
January 21, 1983 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Associ-
ation, 3 the first "Dear Doctor" letters went out in July and August, and
the FDA published reports of the first 12 reported "adverse pregnancy
outcomes" in the August 27 issue of the Lancet.7 4 In September, after the
Health Research Group charged that the drug was being oversold, the
first labeling changes were made: information was included about "hu-
man congenital abnormalities," and the pregnancy contraindication was
put into boldface type.75 The new label also included information about
71 Information was also available about other potential side effects, which in-
cluded conjunctivitis, fatigue, rashes, alopecia (hair loss), skin infection, increased
sensitivity to the sun, and chemical abnormalities of the liver. See Chorlton, supra
note 27, at A17, col. 5.
72 Editorial, The Needless Tragedies of Accutane, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1988,
at A34, col. 1.
73 Yoder, supra note 28, at 350.74 Rosa, supra note 29, at 513.
71 Adverse Effects of Isotretinoin Prompt Labeling Changes, [Developments
1983-1984] Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 43,035 (Nov. 1983).
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serious central nervous system and gastrointestinal side effects, and re-
minded practitioners that the drug should be reserved for treatment of
severe recalcitrant cystic acne unresponsive to conventional therapy.
By early 1984, with 16 major birth defects and 20 spontaneous abortions
reported to the FDA, the labeling was again changed.75 Roche now advised
women to use effective forms of contraception for a month before and
after Accutane use, requested a pregnancy test two weeks before the start
of treatment, and added a boxed warning about a cerebral side effect that
mimicked the symptoms of a brain tumor. As a precautionary measure,
the FDA asked blood banks not to accept donations from people during
and up to a month after Accutane therapy, fearing that the blood might
be transfused into pregnant women. Roche prepared educational adver-
tisements detailing proper prescribing procedures, which appeared in
"Medical Director's Page" formats in medical and pharmacy journals. As
early as May 1984, however, the FDA's Dermatologic Drugs Advisory
Committee rejected suggestions that Accutane prescriptions be restricted
to dermatologists, that a second opinion be required before initiation of
therapy, and that a contraceptive automatically be prescribed in combi-
nation with the drug.77
As reports of birth defects continued, minor labeling changes and pub-
licity efforts occurred. It was not until 1988, however, that the FDA
publicly concluded that its earlier efforts at education and admonition
had failed, estimating that many more than the 62 reported cases of birth
defects had occurred in the 16,000 to 24,000 exposures of pregnant women
to the drug between 1982 and 1986.78 When the Dermatologic Drugs
Advisory Committee met on April 26, its members rejected a ban on the
drug but asked for unusually stiff restrictions; in what many called an
extraordinary and unprecedented step, the Committee advised that the
drug's availability to doctors be curtailed, although it did not specify
how. 79 Suggestions included limiting prescriptions to certain specialists,
limiting the types of patients who could obtain the drug (e.g., by age or
severity of acne), or requiring a second opinion before therapy. Although
such measures had been taken by individual companies on their own in
the past, the FDA had never taken such action against an approved drug,
and many observers doubted the agency had the legal right to do so. 80
The Public Citizen Litigation Group, a sister organization of Dr. Sidney
Wolfe's Health Research Group, soon filed a petition requesting that the
FDA invoke imminent hazard provisions to remove Accutane from the
market until highly restrictive new approval restrictions could be de-
signed.
76 Accutane Warnings Expanded: Blood Banks Asked Not to Accept Donations
from Persons Under Treatment, supra note 35.
77 PINK SHEET, May 21, 1984, at T&G-2.
71 Abramowitz and Hilts, supra note 37, at Al, col. 2.79 Waldholz, supra note 54, at 3, col. 2.
80 See, e.g., Altman, supra note 70; Popular Anti-Acne Drug Linked to Birth
Defects, TRIAL, June 1988, at 89.
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Not surprisingly, the FDA chose a middle ground, requiring compre-
hensive labeling, packaging and marketing changes8 ' but declining to
restrict physician access to the drug. Revised patient labeling included a
statement that the risk of birth defects was one in four or greater, a
photograph (later a drawing) of an infant with typical deformities, a
"nonpregnancy" symbol on each page, advice that patients obtain an
informed consent form, a statement advising prescriptions to begin only
on the second or third day of the menstrual cycle, and a phone number
to call for further information. The revised physician labeling included
stronger contraindications in bigger print, advised that the drug be with-
held unless the patient was capable of understanding the risks and com-
plying with the procedures, advised that patients acknowledge the
warnings both orally and in writing and have a negative pregnancy test
within two weeks of beginning therapy, included the nonpregnancy sym-
bol, and advised that Accutane should be prescribed only by physicians
with special competence in treating this form of acne. A detailed informed
consent form was developed for mailings to all physicians who might
prescribe the drug, and the patient brochure was revised to include the
photograph/drawing. Blister packaging was developed, dispensing only
ten doses at a time and including a nonpregnancy symbol on the package
of each individual dose. Each blister pack included a tear-off, pre-paid
postcard for patients to provide identifying information and proof that
the informed consent was received.
The distribution of these unique "Pregnancy Prevention Kits" began
on September 19, 1988. Although some observers thought the plan was
"a bold example of what can be accomplished when a manufacturer,
professional organizations, and FDA cooperate in finding ways to mini-
mize the risks of a drug while preserving its availability to those who
can greatly benefit from it,"82 others thought the FDA had not gone far
enough. By October 1989, over 12,000 women were enrolled in Roche's
survey, and the company had begun a dermatologist-targeted advertising
campaign with an untraditional focus on drug contraindications, rather
than drug uses. 83 There were some indications of the programs' success:
there were 12 reported cases of birth defects in 1986, 10 in 1987, 3 in
1988, and 4 in 1989.m By May 1990, however, some FDA officials con-
cluded that the campaign had failed: an estimated 65,000 women of child-
bearing age had received new prescriptions for the drug in 1989, despite
beliefs that only about 4,300 women had the severe form of acne for which
81 See sources cited supra, note 38.
2 Judith Willis, New Warnings About Accutane and Birth Defects, FDA CON-
SUMER, October 1988, at 26, 29.
RSee PINK SHEET 1986, Oct. 23, 1989, (LEXIS, Genmed library, T&G-7 &
T&G-8).
"Charles Marwick, Additional Steps Proposed to Ensure Antiacne Drug Used
Only in Appropriate Patient Population, 263 JAMA 3125-26 (1990). However,
critics argued that the expected rate of contraceptive failures suggested that from
33 to 227 birth defects actually occur each year; Dr. Graham estimated 112-130
birth defects for 1989. Id.
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the drug was indicated.85 Roche took additional steps, including prepa-
ration of a videocassette about the risks of the drug (for patients to view
in the doctor's office), and expansion of referrals to obstetrician/gynecol-
ogists for pre-therapy pregnancy testing. The FDA agreed to wait until
the end of 1990 before assessing the effects of the company's educational
efforts. On May 20, 1991, the Dermatologics Drugs and Fertility and
Maternal Health Drugs Advisory Committee concluded that the cam-
paign was succeeding and unanimously rejected restrictions on the dis-
tribution of Accutane, but suggested further tightening of the label warn-
ings.86
2. Assessing the Accutane Efforts
It is extremely difficult to assess the effectiveness of the warnings and
educational campaigns used to try to decrease the number of Accutane-
induced birth defects. A large part of the problem is the lack of adequate
statistics; proponents claim the rate of birth defects has fallen as the
education campaign and stringent warnings took effect, but others claim
the number of unreported cases is, and has always been, much higher.
The deficiencies in our ADR system contribute to the lack of knowledge
of how many birth defects, spontaneous abortions, and even voluntary
abortions occurred in exposed women. Yet some of this may be due to the
way in which Accutane exerts its teratogenic effects. Since damage to
the fetus occurs before day 4087 (before many women realize they are
pregnant), and may result from even limited exposure, a woman may be
unaware that she has exposed her fetus to the drug. Similarly, it is difficult
to count spontaneous abortion rates in a population that may not know
it is pregnant.
8 William Booth, Education Drive on Risks of Accutane Said to Fail, WASH.
POST, May 22, 1990, at A9, col. 6; (Isotretinoin Reviewed by Advisory Committees),(New Matters] Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 41,918 (May 22, 1990). Despite
some satisfaction with the Pregnancy Prevention Program, the Dermatologics
Advisory Committee also recommended that Roche launch a new program de-
signed to encourage patients to return all "leftover medication." FDA Advises
Return of Accutane, DRUG STORE NEWS, July 23, 1990, at IP4.
m The committees recommended that doctors wait for negative pregnancy test
results before filling Accutane prescriptions, that women be warned not to start
Accutane therapy until the second day of their menstrual cycles, that the ac-
ceptable types of pregnancy tests be expanded, and that the drug indication be
changed to reflect changing dermatological definitions of acne. The committees
relied in part on Roche's preliminary data from an ongoing study of Accutane
use in women of childbearing age, conducted by Boston University's Slone Epi-
demiology Unit. See Roche Accutane Labeling Should Reflect "Broader Defini-
tions" of Severe Acne, PINK SHEET, May 27, 1991, at 7 (available in LEXIS,
Genmed Library); Expert Panels Reject Restrictions on Acne Drug Distribution,
Reuters, May 20, 1991 (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library). Roche later reported
that the number of new Accutane patients who were women of childbearing age
had declined from 95,000 in 1985 to 57,000 in 1990. Roche Reports Progress in
Accutane Warning Program, FDA CONSUMER, September, 1991, at 4.
87 Popular Anti-Acne Drug Linked to Birth Defects, supra note 80, at 91.
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Even in the beginning, it was clear that the primary task was to keep
this drug away from pregnant women. If anything, the difficulties posed
by Accutane's early teratogenic activity, as well as the well-known fact
that even the most effective contraceptives do fail, could have argued for
more stringent controls from the start.88 While the FDA should be lauded
for its creative and flexible efforts at regulation and education after the
drug entered the market, some blame can certainly be put on the original,
lax warnings.
Another unanswered question is whether the warnings effectively
reached their intended audiences. As one doctor noted, patient illiteracy
and lack of fluency in English makes the literature-based warnings/ed-
ucation approach less attractive. 89 The massive media attention also com-
pounded the problem, and probably led to exposure of more pregnant
women to the drug. If deformed babies were "inevitable" given the media
promotion, it was likely that "high-visibility publicity was necessary to
counteract the positive media attention Accutane received when it first
appeared on the market."9° The educational efforts adopted by Roche at
the FDA's request were largely targeted to physician prescribers (e.g.,
"Dear Doctor" letters or advertisements in medical journals). Efforts to
warn the public, which had read again and again of the "miracle cure,"
were limited. Ideally, a well-informed and ethical physician would not
prescribe the drug if asked by a patient with mild acne. However, more
than most drugs, Accutane requires a level of care and responsibility on
the part of some patients (i.e., women of childbearing age) that the media
failed to stress. Perhaps the FDA could have targeted the general media
more, but it still might not have been enough.
What alternatives were available to the FDA and Roche for preventing
further exposure of pregnant women to Accutane? In severe cases, as with
the anti-arthritis pain-killers in the early 1980's, the FDA has taken
drugs off the market or pressured the manufacturers to do so. But as the
Dermatologic Committee realized, removing Accutane from the market
(whether by FDA command or at Roche's own initiative) would have
deprived thousands of people who were not at risk of the only available
treatment for a disfiguring disease; it might also have had the effect of
slowing development of new drugs with similar profiles.,' Although the
FDA might have imposed stricter limitations on dispensing the drug at
the time of approval, as it recently attempted to do with the anti-schiz-
ophrenic drug Clozaril, 92 imposing restrictions after approval would have
" The Needless Tragedies of Accutane, supra note 72, at A34.
8Altman, supra note 70.
1 Lewis, supra note 31, at 19.
91 Robert S. Stern, When a Uniquely Effective Drug is Teratogenic: The Case
of Isotretinoin, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1007-08 (1989).
92 Wary of a fatal but detectable blood disorder associated with the use of the
uniquely effective drug clozapine (marketed by Sandoz as Clozaril), the FDA
originally required that distribution be "bundled" to an expensive national drug-
distribution and side-effect monitoring system. See, e.g., Carl Salzman, Mandatory
Monitoring for Side Effects: The 'Bundling' of Clozapine, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED.
827 (1990).
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created a host of political and legal battles. In dealing with Accutane,
the FDA used a creative variety of approaches permitted by the U.S. drug
regulatory system. Although it can be seen as a failure of the system to
live up to its potential, the Accutane story may also show us the natural
limits of the U.S. system.
IV. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DRUG REGULATION:
THE BRITISH APPROACH
The U.S. approach to drug regulation is by no means the only one. In
each country, regulatory controls and procedures reflect a careful consid-
eration of the basic dilemmas, combined with the values and traditions
of that particular culture. For these purposes, a good counterexample to
the U.S. approach is that of the United Kingdom.
A. The United Kingdom Approach
In many respects, drug regulation in the U.K. is quite similar to the
U.S. Both countries have a licensing process, both require approval before
a drug enters the market, and both maintain control over marketed prod-
ucts. The key difference, however, is that
in the U.K.... regulatory practice has more readily accom-
modated to the unpalatable truth that the research process
continues even after a licensed drug has been made available
for general prescription, and that serious, rare side effects will
not necessarily manifest themselves until a drug has been used
by a far greater proportion of the population than is feasible
even with extensive pre-market testing.9 3
This contrast in regulatory philosophy shifts the emphasis on safety to
post-marketing surveillance mechanisms.
Drug regulation in the U.K. is governed by the Medicines Act 1968.9 4
Prior to the Act, there were no safety or efficacy requirements for drugs;
it was in this atmosphere that the thalidomide disaster occurred. A tem-
porary, voluntary system of controls, with which most manufacturers
complied, was instituted after the disaster; it was replaced by the Med-
icines Act 1968, which imposed safety and efficacy requirements and
required companies to submit new drug applications to the Committee
on Safety and Medicines ("CSM") for approval.95
13 Teff, supra note 4, at 579.
See generally Teff, supra note 4, for a comprehensive look at the history of
drug regulation in England.
" The British system strives to be "scientific," rather than "political". To this
end, safety decisions are made directly by the CSM, while efficacy decisions are
made by committees of medical advisors. In the U.S., the FDA has responsibility
for both. See Rosemary Pierce Wall, Note, International Trends in New Drug
Approval Regulation: The Impact on Pharmaceutical Innovation, 10 RUTGERS




Very briefly: In England, a clinical trial certificate ("CTC") will be
issued if the animal and volunteer studies satisfy safety, quality and
efficacy criteria; no authorization is needed before this point. Trials sim-
ilar to Phases II and III are then conducted under CSM guidelines, and
the licensing authority must be "satisfied" as to safety, efficacy, and qual-
ity before final approval. The differences are most apparent, however,
once the drug has gained approval. Systematic, mandatory reporting of
adverse reactions and ineffective treatments through formalized proce-
dures is the rule. Moreover,
[in the U.K., not only is there more stress on monitoring post-
market adverse reaction, but limiting the right to prescribe
certain drugs to hospital pharmacies, or to particular categories
of medical specialists, is an accepted method of identifying and
minimizing potential harm.96
The British regulation of Accutane illustrates some of these ap-
proaches.9 7 Like thalidomide and certain chemotherapy agents, Accutane
is in a special, stringently controlled category. A woman with acne must
receive a referral from her own doctor to one of the select 350 dermatol-
ogists who can prescribe the drug. If the drug is indicated, the derma-
tologist must warn the woman of the risks of becoming pregnant, provide
a written warning, obtain two copies of a signed informed consent form
(one of which the woman keeps), and obtain her agreement that she will
obtain an immediate abortion should she become pregnant.
Thus, the British system regularly relies on precisely the types of phy-
sician and patient restrictions that the FDA refused to adopt for Accutane.
From a legal perspective, this is perhaps not surprising. The British
system was designed to include such restrictive measures; since the U.S.
system was not, it is no wonder that people questioned the FDA's authority
to do so. In addition, the later development of the British system (1968
compared to 1938), and its response to the special circumstances of the
thalidomide tragedy, may have influenced the drafting process. Yet the
real differences are deeper, and reflect each culture's attitudes towards
regulation and health care in general.
The distribution, price, and control of pharmaceuticals in Britain (and
many other European nations) is strongly influenced by the existence of
a nationalized health care system.98 Under the National Health Service
("NHS"), created in 1948, primary care is provided by government-em-
ployed general practitioners; referrals are then made to specialists (called
"consultants"), most of whom are employed by regional health authorities.
Although a growing private medical care sector also exists, the predom-
inance of NHS makes post-marketing control of pharmaceuticals easier.
Teff, supra note 4, at 579.
See Kolata, supra note 2, at A25, col. 3-4.
I' For a brief overview of the British system, see H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ,
THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING HOSPITAL CARE 12-25 (1984).
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In particular, such a centralized system is much more efficient at col-
lecting and processing reports of adverse reactions from patient records 9
The British government is the employer of most physicians, as well as
the single major purchaser of drugs. NHS directly bears the costs of many
drug prescriptions.10 0 Recently, a rising national drug bill led the gov-
ernment to distribute a list that limited the drugs for which NHS would
pay; the introduction of strict drug budgets for practitioners (with finan-
cial penalties for overprescribing) has also been suggested.'0' The power
exercised by the British government as the major drug purchaser, com-
bined with a referral-based system of consultants, makes it easier for the
distribution of drugs to be closely limited and monitored. 0 2 A national
system of health care also allows the government to exercise control over
drug prices, and sometimes over drug development as well.13 Although
the U.S. government is also one of its country's largest drug purchasers
(through Medicare and Medicaid), it has not used its position to exact the
same measure of formal or informal control on drug distribution as its
British counterpart.
To a certain extent, this may be due to deeper cultural value differences
between the nations that contribute to very different regulatory atmos-
pheres. Harvey Teff has noted the British preference for administrative
secrecy, compared to the American reverence of official accountability
and public access to information. 04 Teff traces the British attitude to an
historical "notion that the government somehow owns rather than holds
in trust information of public interest."'0 ' By contrast, the American po-
- See Wall, supra note 94, at 325-26; Teff, supra note 4, at 579. However, many
analysts agree that the lack of a centralized health care system does not create
insurmountable barriers to the development of such a monitoring system. See,
e.g., Wall, supra.
-o There are some limits on the possible overprescription of such drugs, how-
ever. See Aaron and Schwartz, supra note 97, at 17 (claiming that "in practice
the power to prescribe has little financial reach because GPs provide patients no
care more sophisticated (or costly) than that which can be dispensed from the
office."). In addition, "prescription-happy doctors may come under review by other
physicians and be warned." Id.
101 John Lister, Special Report: Proposals of Reform of the British National
Health Service, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 877, 878 (1989).
102 In fact, one reason that the voluntary regulatory scheme in place from 1964
to 1971 was successful had to do with the government's role as a major purchaser.
"[I]n practice all the major manufacturers complied with it, not least because the
vast bulk of their domestic trade was with the National Health Service, and
doctors could be informed that a drug had not received the committee [on Safety
of Drugs]' approval." Teff, supra note 4, at 575.
103 For a discussion of price controls in Britain, see Teff, supra note 4, at 602-
06. Restrictive attitudes towards new drug development are illustrated by the
policies of the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare ("NBHW"). By
severely restricting "me-too" drugs, "much like a hospital formulary which se-
lectively includes drugs from therapeutic categories, these NBHW regulations
have the effect of limiting available drugs in Sweden to those with significant
therapeutic differences." Wall, supra note 94, at 327.
104 Teff, supra note 4, at 578-81.
101 d. at 580.
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litical system demands public accountability. Thus the British regulatory
system is characterized by secrecy, while that in America involves "sub-
stantial Congressional oversight, constant media exposure and the influ-
ence of the consumer lobby."10 6 Different political histories and cultural
values in Britain and the United States have thus created very different
atmospheres in which drug regulation evolved.
B. The Approaches in Perspective
Is the British approach truly more effective than the American one?
The less stringent pre-approval requirements of the U.K. system do gen-
erate less paper and lead to quicker review of drugs. One study found the
mean licensing time in 1980 for new chemical entities in the U.K. to be
17.4 months, compared to 34.5 in the U.S.; the U.K. median was 12.7
months, compared to 32.5 for the U.S."07 However, the data on drug safety
are not as clear. Between 1970 and 1989, the U.K. approved 55 more
drugs than the U.S., but also discontinued the production of more (33
compared to 19); from 1963 to 1969, when the U.K. did not require proof
of efficacy, 77% of the "extra" 48 drugs that made it onto the U.K. market
were discontinued. 0 8 The recent data suggest that the two systems, al-
though they may give different results for particular drugs, are of almost
equal overall effectiveness.
What is clear, however, is that the European experience with Accutane
has been vastly different from that of the U.S. By 1988, only 9 babies
with severe birth defects linked to Accutane were reported outside the
U.S.; six of those occurred in Canada, where the drug is regulated in the
same manner as in the U.S. 10 9 What this may suggest is not that the
British approach is superior as an overall system, but that it may be
better equipped to deal with the rather unusual case of Accutane. For a
system designed to avoid the dangers of a drug like thalidomide, perhaps
that is not surprising.
C. Changing the U.S. System
What, then, are the chances of adopting the British attitude toward
post-marketing surveillance which appears to have spared the Europeans
'06 Id. at 579-80.107 A. Alister Dunning, Regulation, New Drug Development, and the Question
of Delay, 41 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 139, 140 (1986).
108 Jim Dickinson, Drug Regulation in the Nineties, MED. MARKETING & MEDIA
4 (Jan. 1990) (citing a study by the FDA Office of Planning and Evaluation).
,09 Kolata, supra note 2, at A25. Other European countries have taken different
but also stringent approaches to the drug. In Spain, the drug is only prescribed
by dermatologists and only through hospital formularies. Sweden, which did not
approve the drug, will provide it if doctors make special, documented requests
for it. And in France, the drug is restricted because the national health insurance
will not cover it, and patients must pay for it themselves. Id. at col. 3-6.
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the tragedy of Accutane? The calls for expanded post-marketing surveil-
lance in the U.S. have come from many quarters. Some proposals target
a particular type of drug, such as contraceptives or generics, and some
propose sweeping changes in the regulatory system itself. One particu-
larly interesting proposal, emanating from the then-chairman of the De-
partment of Medicine at Stanford University School of Medicine, sug-
gested using the record-keeping systems developed for Medicaid and Med-
icare, and would finance the system by a $.01 tax on each prescription
sold." 0
There is some evidence of more concrete changes in FDA surveillance
practices, however. The Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1979, which was
passed by the Senate but never made it through the House, would have
provided explicit authorization for the FDA to require surveillance in
many cases."' The 1980's revisions of the IND and NDA procedures were
much more explicit in their requirements for the reporting of adverse
reactions by pharmaceutical companies." 2 And, in perhaps the most
promising development, the FDA has recently established an internal
task force to study the possibility of "conditional" approval for drugs for
life-threatening illnesses, combined with careful post-market scrutiny. 1 3
What all these plans suggest is a piece-by-piece adoption of post-market
orientation for certain drugs only, rather than a full-scale revision of the
system. Perhaps this is exactly what is needed; after all, it is in "special"
cases, such as Accutane, that the British system appears to be superior.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Future Regulation in the United States
The Accutane story can be viewed in many ways. It can be seen as a
failure of the U.S. drug regulatory system, of the clinical trials, ADR
reports, and warnings-based approach to regulating a dangerous drug. It
110 See Regional News section, New Hampshire edition, Proprietary to the
United Press International, May 9, 1982. Unfortunately, the specific procedures
by which such a system would operate were not identified at that time. For other
proposals, see, e.g., Contraceptive Post-Marketing Surveillance System Should be
Established, Two FDA Panels Concur, THE BLUE SHEET, June 20, 1990, at 4; FDA
Actions Against Drug Manufacturers Should be Available to Providers Under
FD&C Act, AphA Tells Dingell; Mandatory Two Year Post-Marketing Studies
Urged, THE PINK SHEET, Mar. 19, 1990, at 6; Richard Know, New Data to Force
Change in Heart Drug Use: Broader Issues Arise as FDA Speeds Approvals and
Seeks to Detect Drug Problems After They Reach the Market, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
30, 1989, at 25; THE GRAY SHEET, June 30, 1986, at I&W-7.
- Fleshner, supra note 68, at 339-44.
112 Vicki G. Golden, A Product Safety Program: Preventive Medicine for Drug
Companies, 41 FOOD DRUG CoSM. L.J. 450 (1986).
11 Marlene Cimons, Plan Would Hasten OK for Certain New Drugs, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 1991, at A2. However, this proposal appears to be driven more by the
need to "fast-track" drugs for particularly severe illnesses than by a perceived
need to improve post-market safety controls in general.
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can be seen as a failure of specific parts of the system, such as the original
package labeling, which the other stages were unable to cover. But it can
also be seen as a successful example of how the U.S. system is flexible
enough to address these problems, a "success" story of sorts that simply
illustrates that some drugs require restrictions that our system cannot
accommodate easily.
Accutane does teach us that the parts of the U.S. system are closely
interrelated, and that improvements must be made in all areas simul-
taneously. Speeding drugs through approval is dangerous if we have in-
adequate post-marketing controls. Carefully designed clinical trials will
not be of use unless the labeling accurately reflects their results. A careful
system of reviewing ADR reports with an eye towards immediate labeling
changes is only good if the ADR reports are collected, tabulated, and
made accessible to the reviewers. In essence, isolated changes adopted
from other regulatory systems may not work if the overall U.S. philosophy
and organization is not taken into account.
For these reasons, I do not read the lesson of Accutane to be that the
United States should completely revise its drug regulatory system along
the lines of the British scheme. It is doubtful that a system of strict post-
approval governmental controls would be politically acceptable in this
country, nor has such a system demonstrated substantial advantages for
the vast majority of drugs. At the very least, however, we must improve
our existing procedures in the areas of clinical trial design, package la-
beling, and the collection and assessment of post-market adverse reaction
information. The tremendous flexibility of the current system, which was
demonstrated by the Accutane story, should lead to many more "success"
stories. However, we must be willing to recognize that some drugs, like
Accutane, may simply exceed the limits of our system of pre-approval
testing. For these drugs, which I believe will be few, we must use post-
market information much more efficiently, and be willing to contemplate
stricter post-market controls on distribution and use.
B. Broader Ethical Implications
In one sense, calling for stricter governmental controls over Accutane
only begins the debate. Apart from the dilemmas inherent in any attempt
to regulate drugs, these policies involve our ideas about personal liberty,
autonomy, and responsibility. Although the media, the FDA, Roche Phar-
maceuticals, and prescribing physicians bear some responsibility for the
mistakes of Accutane, the women who took the drug must also share the
burden. It is easy to view these women simply as victims: bombarded by
media reports of the "wonder drug" but not its side effects, they requested
the drug from physicians who either neglected to warn their patients or,
following the drug labeling, saw little need for worry. However, some
women did take the drug without following the recommended contracep-
tive procedures, and some gave birth. If we accept the ideal of individual
autonomy, we must acknowledge that even with the best possible warn-
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ings (which admittedly were lacking here), some patients receiving a drug
will still choose to engage in behaviors that they have been counseled
against. To what extent are we willing to let the government prevent
these abuses, at the cost of individual choice?
Accutane is an especially sensitive example because it implicates not
only a woman's right to take risks for herself, but her right to put her
potential fetus at risk also. Are we willing to allow the government,
through stricter drug controls, to make this choice impossible? Even many
of the less coercive reforms discussed in this Article would make it dif-
ficult, if not impossible, for certain groups to receive such a drug. What
of the woman with severe recalcitrant cystic acne who does not believe
in birth control? Or the woman whose contraceptive device has failed (as
all methods besides abstinence do), but who does not believe in abortion?
Are we comfortable allowing the government to make these decisions for
us? These issues are certainly not new; we have dealt with such problems
on occasion, as in the case of lithium, a treatment for manic-depression."'
But the widespread use of Accutane has brought the problem home to us
in a dramatic way.
It may be argued that some needed improvements in the current drug
regulatory system make these questions less critical. For example, if we
could truly limit the use of Accutane to its single indicated condition, the
number of women who fall into the above categories would be small. But
we must still acknowledge how closely any such discussion is linked to
broader issues of individual choice and freedom, as well as to current
debates over maternal responsibilities and "fetal abuse." Unfortunately,
a closer examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article.
C. A Final Note: Accutane v. Thalidomide
Why hasn't Accutane generated the same sort of emotionally charged
demands for drug reform as thalidomide? The victims of thalidomide made
a compelling picture: since many were of normal intelligence, the public
saw competent individuals "coping with life as best as anyone can when
they lack arms or legs or suffer from other serious deficiencies."11 5 Perhaps
the Accutane victims are simply too disabled, too easily hidden from view,
to generate this amount of public sentiment. Perhaps it is the fact that
the reported numbers of Accutane-induced birth defects are smaller. Per-
haps we are satisfied that the cost of Accutane is low compared to its
114 See generally Zamula, supra note 1.
"s PHILLIP KNIGHTLEY, ET AL., SUFFER THE CHILDREN: THE STORY OF THALIDO-
MIDE (1980). Lest we believe that thalidomide was a great tragedy that became
a fairy-tale regulatory "success" story, however, the authors of this book trace
the "universal neglect" of the victims and the "near-universal abandonment of
families after their afflictions." Id. at 2.
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benefits, and satisfied with the cost-benefit analyses institutionalized in
the U.S. system. Perhaps we have simply accepted the U.S. system as an
embodiment of our political and philosophical ideals. Or perhaps change
will come slowly, in the form of tightened procedures and an evolving
regulatory philosophy. Perhaps one day these words, written about tha-
lidomide, will apply equally well to Accutane:
As statutory gaps in consumer protection came to be inter-
preted in terms of deformed babies, public clamor arose for
strengthening the law in every respect necessary to close those
gaps.118
16 Janssen, supra note 6, at 437.
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